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Abstract. Population Aging poses an evident threat to the financial sustainability of pension 
systems  based  on  a  “pay-as-you-go”  (PAYG)  scheme.  To  cope  with  this  threat,  pension 
systems have undergone numerous reforms in many countries in order to keep people longer 
at  work.  One  crucial  element  of  these  reforms  typically  is  an  increase  in  the  statutory 
retirement age at which workers are legally allowed to retire. Two questions still remain 
unanswered: Will people really work longer? Who is more likely to retire before the new legal 
retirement age? 
In this paper, we focus on subjective retirement expectations, analysing if and to what extent 
they are affected by such a policy change. We consider the legislative reform introduced in 
Germany in 2007, which gradually will increase the statutory retirement age (SRA) from 65 
to  67  years.  Using  the  SAVE  survey,  a  representative  panel  of  German  households,  we 
estimate the increase of the individuals’ expected retirement age (ERA) as an effect of the 
reform.  
Our results show that less productive workers living in relatively wealthier households are 
more likely to plan an early retirement. The introduction of the reform seems to motivate 
better educated workers to remain longer in the labour force although it does not seem to 
completely  succeed  in  keeping  women  longer  in  the  labour  force:  especially  among  the 
younger cohorts, whose SRA will be 67 years, women are still more likely than men to plan 
an early retirement. In terms of the magnitude of the effect, we find that the reform shifted the 
expectations  of  the  younger  cohorts  by  almost  two  years  –  if  these  expectations  will  be 
realized, this reform would have been quite successful. 
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Population  ageing  is  one  of  the  most  relevant  demographic  phenomena  affecting 
many countries in the world. The combination of low fertility rates and substantial 
gains in life expectancy – particularly at older ages – implies a substantial increase in 
the ratio of people aged 65 years and above to those of working age (15 to 64 years) 
over the next decades. In addition, many countries experienced a so-called baby boom 
in  the  1950s  and  1960s,  followed  by  a  so-called  baby  bust  thereafter  so  that 
comparatively large cohorts were followed directly by comparatively small cohorts. 
This will worsen the ratio even further once the baby-boom cohorts reach age 65+. 
Such  an  outlook  poses  an  evident  threat  to  the  financial  sustainability  of  pension 
systems based on a “pay-as-you-go” (PAYG) scheme where the contributions of the 
working age population directly finance the benefits of the old. Furthermore, after the 
recent  economic  and  fiscal  crisis  and  the  rapid  increase  in  public  debt,  the 
implementation of reforms aimed at changing the generosity of social entitlements has 
been urged by several big political players (see for example IMF 2010). The increase 
in the statutory retirement age (that is, the age at which workers are legally allowed to 
retire) is one of tools widely recommended to cope with these threats (see for example 
OECD, 2006). Often coupled with closing existing windows for early retirements, 
increasing the statutory retirement age is supposed to keep people longer at work as it 
changes the set of economic incentives to retire.  
However, in terms of the effectiveness of such type of reform, many questions still 
remain unanswered: Will people really work longer? For how many years? Who is 
going to stay in the labour market and who is more likely to leave before reaching the 
new legal retirement age? Are individuals saving enough to finance an early departure 
from  the  labour  force  that  allows  them  to  substitute  smaller  public  pensions  by 
additional private pension income? 
To  answer  such  questions  it  becomes  extremely  important  to  understand  how 
individuals form their retirement plans and which factors affect their decisions. In this 
paper, we focus on subjective retirement expectations, analysing if and to what extent 
they are affected by such a policy change. Two reasons motivate our work: first, if 
public policies aimed at altering retirement patterns are to be successful, they have to 
alter workers' expectations concerning the tradeoffs associated with retirement. We 
need therefore to better understand the conditions that lead workers to formulate and 
alter their expected  retirement age. Second, long term decisions, and in particular 
saving and investment decisions, are based on expectations about the future: among 
them, expectations about the retirement age are likely to play a prominent role, so that 
understanding how public policies affect them is quite important for understanding 
current saving behaviour and wealth accumulation altogether.  In recent years research using expectation questions has increased at a very fast pace: 
since the early 1990's socio-economic surveys have been enriched with questions to 
elicit expectations of significant events, such as macroeconomic shocks, risks faced or 
future income (see Manski, 2004; Pesaran and Weale, 2006). In general subjective 
expectations have been found to be strong predictors of future outcomes (see e.g. 
Hurd  and  McGarry,  2001,  for  an  analysis  of  survival  probability  and  subsequent 
mortality, or Stephens, 2004, on the relationship between job loss probabilities and 
job displacement). 
This  applies  particularly  to  retirement  expectations.
1  Their  accuracy  has  been 
examined in several studies which compare retirement expectations and outcomes. 
These studies generally conclude that individuals form rational retirement plans, stick 
to them, are able to anticipate most changes in factors relevant to their decision and 
respond in the expected way to unanticipated changes in circumstances (Bernheim 
1989, 1990; Honig, 1996; Disney and Tanner, 1999; Dwyer and Hu, 1999; Chan and 
Stevens, 2004; Benitez-Silva and Dwyer, 2005; Haider and Stephens 2007; Cobb-
Clark  and  Stillman,  2009).  Other  studies  have  focussed  on  the  analysis  of  the 
determinants  of  retirement  expectations,  finding  that  retirement  plans  vary  with 
individual circumstances in a plausible manner.  In particular, Dwyer and Mitchell 
(1999) and Dwyer (2001) find that even after controlling for economic circumstances, 
health is a very important factor in shaping retirement plans, and health shocks induce 
people  to  retire  earlier  than  expected.  Munnell  et  al.  (2004)  focus  on  the  role  of 
pension coverage and pension type on the expected retirement age (ERA), finding that 
the  presence  of  pension  wealth  lowers  the  ERA  and  that  the  incentives  for  early 
retirement under defined benefits plans reduce it even further.  
Another  strand  of  the  literature  has  looked  at  the  effect  of  policy  changes  on 
expectations. So for example, Michaud and van Soest (2007) analysed the effect on 
retirement expectations of the repeal in the USA of the earnings test above the normal 
retirement  age,  which  taxes  away  earnings  later  in  life.  They  found  a  substantial 
increase in the reported probability of working after age 62 for those workers whose 
marginal wage rate increased because of the repeal. Several studies have analysed the 
effect of pension reforms on retirement plans in Italy. These studies are closely related 
to  our  research  for  two  reasons:  first,  among  other  things,  the  Italian  reforms 
increased the mandatory retirement age for the employees in the private sectors as did 
the  German  reform.  Second,  the  reforms  affected  some  groups  leaving  others 
                                                 
1  Expectations  are  defined  as  „subjectively  held  beliefs  by  individual  about  uncertain  future 
outcomes“(Pesaran and Weale, 2006 p.720). As individuals can actively determinate when enter 
retirement,  strictly  speaking  we  should  talk  about  retirement  plans  rather  than  expectations. 
However, as the retirement decision is influenced by many factors over which individuals have no 
or little control (such as state regulations, health or employment status) we will use in the following 
the terms “retirement expectations” and “retirement plans” as almost synonyms.  unaffected – as it is the case in Germany – allowing the effects to be estimated with a 
difference-in-differences (DD) approach analogous to the one we use in our work. We 
will therefore summarize these studies more in detail. The first study dealing with this 
issue is Brugiavini (1997), which looks at the shift in retirement expectations between 
the years 1991 and 1993 (after a major bill of reforms was passed in 1992) finding a 
surprising decline in the ERA. She argues that the debate on early retirement that the 
reform initiated, shifted the attention of the respondents to this issue, so that after 
1992 they started to think of their retirement age as the early retirement age and not 
any more as the normal retirement age, an effect known in the literature as recognition 
effect (Cagan, 1965). This interpretation is contested by Mastrogiacomo (2004), who 
points out two sources of bias not taken into account in Brugiavini's work, which 
make her results difficult to interpret: the bias due to sample attrition and that due to 
“don't know” answers. He finds that over the time span 1989 - 2000, the reforms 
indeed induced individuals to postpone their retirement plans by more than two years. 
He recognizes the existence of a recognition effect, but he finds that it can be ascribed 
only to those who were actually not involved in the reform. He also finds that the 
reforms, particularly the first one introduced in 1992, increased uncertainty among 
Italian workers, although the results remain unchanged after the model is corrected to 
take  this  into  account. Also  Bottazzi  et  al.  (2006)  estimate  the  effect  of  pension 
reforms  on  households'  expectations  of  retirement  outcomes  in  the  attempt  to 
understand  to  what  extent  individuals  perceive  and  react  to  changes.  Other  than 
Mastrogiacomo (2004), the authors drop the information concerning the transitional 
period and compare the expectations before and after the whole reform process (that 
is, before 1992 and after 1999). They find that on average the ERA increased by about 
two years for men and three years for women as a result of the whole set of reforms.  
While these studies reveal that subjective ERAs are a valuable source of information 
and that most groups actually revise their expectations in the anticipated direction, 
these effects are due to the simultaneous change of several parameters of the pension 
system (not only the legal retirement age but also the minimum years of contributions 
as  well  as  the  entire  formula  to  calculate  pension  benefits)  in  different  ways  for 
different groups.
2 This makes it impossible to single out which is the effect of each 
piece of the reforms on retirement expectations. How much of the observed increase 
in the expected retirement age is due to the change in the legal retirement age and 
how much is due to the change in the pension award formula?  
In our work we aim at identifying the effect of an increase in the statutory retirement 
                                                 
2  So if, for example, the legal retirement age increased after the reforms  in the same way for all the 
workers who started working before 1995, irrespectively of their years of contributions, the change 
in the pension award formula makes a distinction between workers with more or less than 18 years 
of contributions in 1995 (for details see Bottazzi et al. 2006, Table 1). age (SRA) on subjective retirement expectations as distinct from other changes in the 
pension  system.  The  legislative  reform  introduced  in  Germany  in  2007  changed 
exclusively the SRA of employees (which will be gradually increased from 65 to 67 
years from 2012 on) and offers a better setting for the analysis of this issue.  
Using the SAVE survey, a representative panel of German households with a specific 
focus  on  saving  and  investment  choices  we  use  a  DD  approach  to  estimate  the 
increase  of  the  individuals’  ERA  as  a  result  of  the  reform,  after  correcting  (as 
suggested in Mastrogiacomo, 2004) for possible biases due to sample attrition and 
item  nonresponse.  Furthermore,  our  study  complements  the  existing  literature  by 
looking at the role played by financial literacy in shaping individuals' reactions to 
policy  reforms.  Indeed,  as  recognized  by  Bottazzi  et  al.  (2006),  the  success  of  a 
reform crucially depends on how individuals understand the new rules. Making use of 
two special questions asked in the survey 2009, we aim at detecting the role played by 
a better knowledge of the functioning of the pensions system. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a short historical overview of the 
main  reforms  of  the  German  pension  system,  with  a  special  focus  on  the  reform 
implemented  in  2007;  section  3  offers  an  overview  of  the  literature  on  the 
determinants of today’s actual retirement decisions in Germany; section 4 presents the 
data and the descriptive analysis; section 5 presents the results of the econometric 
models. Section 6, finally, concludes. 
2.  The German pension system and the 2007 reform 
The  German  pension  system  was  the  first  formal  pension  system  in  the  world, 
designed by Bismarck 120 years ago. It was very successful in providing a high and 
reliable  level  of  retirement  income  in  the  past  at  reasonable  contribution  rates, 
becoming a model for many social security systems worldwide. While the generosity 
of  the  German  public  pension  system  is  considered  a  great  social  achievement, 
negative  incentive  effects  of  past  reforms  in  the  1970s  and  1980s  and population 
aging are threatening the very core of the system. These have led to several pension 
reforms since 1992.  
The German pension system is based on a point system where contributors acquire a 
certain amount of earning points per year depending on their wage.
3 The accumulated 
sum  of  earning  points  at  the  time  of  retirement  is  multiplied  with  the  so-called 
pension value in order to determine the size of the individual pension. This pension 
value  is  indexed  to  the  development  of  average  wages  and  its  formula  has  been 
                                                 
3 A person earning the average wage acquires one earning point (EP), persons who earn less (more) 
than the average wage, acquire proportionally less (more) EPso. E.g. a person that earns 80% of the 
average wage in a certain year acquires 0,8 EPs fort hat year. altered several times during past reforms. It now comprises an additional component 
that accounts for changes in the system’s dependency ratio.
4 Since the pension value 
is  newly  computed  every  year  and  is  the  same  for  all  pensioners,  changes  in  the 
development  of  the  current  pension  value  affect  all  pensioners  equally.  This  is  a 
crucial difference to other countries’ pension systems where reforms often only affect 
younger pensioner cohorts and maintain the status of older pensioners.
5 
Another crucial parameter that determines the size of the individual pension is the 
retirement age. Persons who retire earlier (later) than the statutory retirement age get 
their accumulated sum of EPs reduced (increased) by a certain percentage for each 
month  of  earlier  (later)  retirement.
6  This  reduction  (increase)  holds  for  the  entire 
retirement period and thus is of a permanent nature.  
The 2007 reform implemented a gradual increase in the statutory retirement age from 
age 65 today to age 67 in 2030. The increase will start in 2012, adjusting the SRA  
each year by one month from age 65 to 66 until 2023, and then each year by two 
months from age 66 to 67 until 2029. The phase-in is cohort-oriented, it will affect 
only  cohorts  younger  than  1947.  For  cohorts  born  after  1963  the  new  statutory 
retirement age of 67 finally applies.
7 Table 1 gives an overview of the new SRAs for 
the different birth cohorts. 
 
                                                 
4 For a more detailed description of the German pension reform process in general and the German 
pension benefit formula in specific, see Wilke (2009). 
5 See e.g. the so called “Amato” reform in Italy in 1992, which increased the SRA and the minimum 
amount of years of contribution to collect benefits only for employees who at the time of the reform 
had less than 15 years of full-time contribution (for further information: Mastrogiacomo, 2004). 
6 A person looses 3% of their earning points for each month of earlier retirement and gains 5% for each 
month of later retirement. 
7 For a detailed description of the reform and a first assessment, see Bucher-Koenen und Wilke (2009).  
 
3.  Determinants of actual retirement behaviour in Germany 
The economic and sociological literature on the determinants of retirement behaviour 
uses to distinguish between push and pull factors (for a classification of the push and 
pull factors and a selective review of the studies dealing with retirement decisions see 
OECD,  2006).  While  the  former  are  usually  perceived  as  beyond  the  control  of 
individuals (such as general labour market conditions, occupational policies at the 
firm level or health shocks), the latter are closely related to individuals' preferences. 
Although  push  factors  play  definitely  a  role  in  determining  the  transition  into 
retirement (see for example Wübbeke, 2005; Radl, 2007), pull factors have turned out 
to be more relevant in shaping retirement decisions (see Riphahn and Schmidt, 1997; 
Börsch-Supan, 2000).  
In  particular,  previous  research  for  Germany  has  shown  that individuals  are  quite 
sensitive to the financial incentives embedded in the pension system: when included 
in  a  regression  explaining  individual  retirement  behaviour,  the  financial  costs  of 
postponing retirement (measured by the so-called option value
8) are found to be a 
strong determinant of the probability of being retired at a given age. Börsch-Supan 
(2000) e.g. finds that the option value turns out to be statistically highly significant in 
                                                 
8 For a detailed explanation of the option value approach, see e.g. Stock and Wise (1990). 
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 all his regressions while most of the socio-demographic determinants such as gender, 
marital status or education mostly remain insignificant. Similarly, Berkel and Börsch-
Supan (2004) find a strong effect of the option value on the retirement decision and 
estimate an increase in the average retirement age of men by about 2.5 years for a 
scenario where the statutory retirement age is changed from 65 to 67 years. More 
recently, Hanel (2010) estimated that the changes in accrued social security wealth as 
a  result  of  the  German  pension  reforms  of  the  1990's  led  to  a  postponement  of 
individual  retirement  entries  by  about  14  months  and  a  shift  in  the  exit-from  the 
labour market by about 10 months.   
In addition to these institutional incentives, several other factors have also been found 
to affect the retirement decisions of Germans. Health status for example appears to 
have a very strong effect (Siddiqui, 1997; Börsch-Supan, 2000; Berkel and Börsch-
Supan, 2004; Wübbeke, 2005; Radl, 2007) as well as subjective survival probability 
(Börsch-Supan  et  al.,  2009).  These  results  have  important  implications:  in  an 
actuarially  fair  system,  early  retirement  implies  receiving  a  smaller  pension  for  a 
longer time. If poor health conditions force individuals out of the labour force earlier 
than planned there are possible negative consequences on the living standard because 
of the tighter financial means. And an increase in the statutory retirement age is likely 
to urge more people into early retirement than under the status quo. The question is to 
what  extent  social  security  systems  can  cover  these  risks.
9  Self-reported  health, 
however, suffers from a justification bias: early retirees might report poor-health in 
order to legitimate their early departure from the labour market. The effect of health 
status  on  retirement  behaviour  thus  might  be  overestimated  if  endogeneity  is  not 
adequately  taken  into  account  (Anderson  and  Burkhauser,  1985;  Bazzoli,  1985; 
Bound, 1991; for a review of the literature on health and retirement decisions see 
Deschryvere, 2005). 
Higher  educational  attainments  are  generally  associated  with  a  later  retirement 
(Berkel and Börsch-Supan, 2004; Radl, 2007) while wealthier individuals are usually 
found to retire earlier (Berkel and Börsch-Supan, 2004). The relationship between 
income  and  retirement  behaviour  appears  to  have  an  inverted  U-shape:  while 
individuals at the very top and at the very bottom of the income distribution tend to 
retire later than the average, individuals at the centre of the distribution have a higher 
probability  to  retire  earlier  than  the  statutory  retirement  age  (Drobnic,  2002; 
Wübbeke, 2005; Radl, 2007).  
 
                                                 
9 The German pension system e.g. offers disability benefits for workers who are no longer able to work 
up to 6 hours a week. See e.g. Wilke (2009) for an institutional description of the German disability 
benefits.  
4.  The data 
The  analysis  in  this  paper  is  based  on  SAVE  (Sparen  und  Altersvorsorge  in 
Deutschland),  a  longitudinal  dataset  started  in  2001  that  focuses  on  households’ 
saving and asset choices. The panel consists of about 3,000 households, which, since 
2005, are surveyed every year. The present work only uses these waves from 2005 to 
2009.  Interviews  are  conducted  with  the  individual  who  knows  best  about  the 
household's financial situation and the questions focus on the respondent and his/her 
spouse.
10  
This  dataset  is  particularly  well-suited  for  the  purposes  of  the  current  study:  the 
SAVE survey not only collects extensive information on all aspects of the household's 
balance  sheet,  it  also  offers  information  on  actual  health  and  relevant  social  and 
psychological  conditions.  Most  important  to  us,  the  survey  includes  questions  on 
individual expectations. In particular, interviewees who are not yet retired have to 
answer the following question: “At which age do you expect to retire or respectively 
to draw retirement benefits?”.
11 As pointed out in Hanel (2010), retirement entry, 
labour  force  exit  and  the  claiming  of  benefits  are  not  necessarily  interchangeable 
terms: indeed she finds a discrepancy between the age at which individuals leave the 
labour  force  and  that  at  which  they  start  receiving  pension  benefits.  Given  the 
wording of the question, we argue that respondents in SAVE report the age at which 
they plan to claim their benefits. However, as a great part of the respondents has still 
many  years  to  go  until  retirement,  the  two  events  (exiting  the  labour  force  and 
claiming benefits) are likely to be indistinguishable for them. Thus, in the remainder 
of the paper we will use the word retirement in a broader sense that reflects both 
perspectives.  
The longitudinal structure of the survey represents a further advantage of the SAVE 
data  over  other  data  sources,  as  it  allows  observing  how  the  reported  retirement 
expectations evolve over time with the arrival of new information. 
An  important  aspect  that  needs  to  be  mentioned  is  the  phenomenon  of  item 
nonresponse.  As  in  all  surveys  that  deal  with  sensitive  topics  such  as  household 
finances, item nonresponse to sensitive questions is not ignorable.
12 To prevent biased 
                                                 
10   See Börsch-Supan et al. (2008) for a detailed description of the dataset. Essig (2005) and Schunk 
(2006) provide further technical details. 
11   In  German:  „In  welchem  Alter  werden  Sie  voraussichtlich  in  Ruhestand  gehen  bzw.  das 
Alterseinkommen  beziehen?“  Actually  the  same  question  is  asked  also  with  respect  to  the 
respondent's partner. These answers, however, cannot be used in our analysis, as it is the reference 
person who reports the expected retirement age of the partner, so that we cannot treat this answer as 
if it was given directly by the partner.  
12   See e.g. Essig and Winter (2003) and Schunk (2006) for a discussion and documentation on this inference  based  on  an  analysis  of  complete  cases  only,  an  iterative  multiple 
imputation  procedure  has  been  applied  to  the  SAVE  data.
13  Multiple  imputation 
simulates the distribution of missing data and allows for a more realistic assessment 
of  variances  in  subsequent  analyses  than  single  imputation.  The  procedure  uses  a 
Markov-Chain  Monte-Carlo  method  to  replace  missing  data  by  draws  from  an 
estimate of the conditional distribution of the data (see e.g. Hoynes et al. (1998), 
Kennickell (1998)). All results in this paper use the fully imputed SAVE data: when it 
comes to the regressions, however, imputed values for the expected retirement age are 
reset to missing to avoid a spurious boost in the observed correlation between the 
expected retirement age and the other covariates.
14  
4.1 The sample 
We  restrict  the  sample  in  several  ways.  As  the  2007  pension  reform  affects  only 
employees, we discard the self-employed, civil servants and farmers Furthermore, we 
discard respondents who report to be casual workers or who are completely out of the 
labour  force  (retirees,  students,  home  keepers).  That  leaves  us  with  almost  3,000 
observations  distributed  over  5  years.  Table  2  offers  an  overview  of  the  main 
characteristics of our sample. 
                                                                                                                                            
issue. 
13   See Schunk (2008). 
14   As missing values are imputed conditional on other observable characteristics, the correlation 
between the variable of interest and the covariates used for its imputation is (by construction) 
extremely high. Table 2: Sample characteristics 
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total
Female RP 56.41% 56.86% 56.85% 56.49% 55.23% 56.41%
Age RP
Under 30 17.08% 17.42% 17.70% 17.95% 15.71% 17.21%
30 – 39 21.95% 21.92% 23.13% 20.90% 21.41% 21.90%
40 – 49 21.24% 22.53% 19.74% 22.90% 24.39% 22.01%
50 – 59 21.24% 22.53% 19.74% 22.90% 24.39% 22.01%
60 and above 4.21% 3.75% 3.73% 4.34% 4.29% 4.05%
Mean 41.97 42.31 41.62 42.59 43.26 42.28
Median 42 43 42 43 44 43
Marital Status
Married 51.23% 50.58% 52.08% 53.75% 58.35% 52.77%
Separated 3.70% 2.64% 2.65% 2.23% 2.29% 2.82%
Single 25.93% 29.09% 27.65% 25.96% 23.57% 26.56%
Divorced 16.54% 15.87% 15.53% 16.63% 14.19% 15.87%
Widowed 2.59% 1.82% 2.08% 1.42% 1.60% 1.98%
Partner HH 60.00% 60.50% 61.55% 64.50% 67.05% 62.23%
Secondary Education
Basic 34.07% 29.09% 30.68% 28.60% 27.69% 30.49%
Middle 45.56% 46.28% 43.18% 45.84% 45.54% 45.32%
High 20.37% 24.63% 26.14% 25.56% 26.77% 24.19%
None 11.85% 11.40% 11.74% 12.78% 10.98% 11.76%
Vocational training 77.78% 75.87% 74.24% 74.85% 76.20% 75.98%
University 10.37% 12.73% 14.02% 12.37% 12.81% 12.25%
Net monthly income 2253.98 1961.65 2024.93 2117.94 2315.41 2136.32
Median 1780 1700 1870 1800 2000 1800
Net financial wealth 20878.91 17063.24 23082.47 20329.85 22500.31 20632.78
Median 4930 3000 3667 3400 5336 4000
Net Worth 128910 102807.7 113454.4 94550.54 97965.98 109970.2
Median 20897.5 16000 21786 16972 22000 19655
Observations 810 605 528 493 437 2873
Post-secondary and tertiary education
Income and Wealth 
 
Three aspects are worth to be stressed. First, the average age of the reference person 
(RP) in the household is 42  years and almost 40% of them are in their 40s. The 
predominance  of  younger  respondents,  who  are  20  or  more  years  away  from 
retirement, is a new feature in comparison with other samples (like the HRS for the 
USA) that typically focus more on older workers. The age structure of the sample is 
ideal for the scope of our analysis, as it is especially the younger birth cohorts who 
will be fully affected by the 2007 pension reform. Of course, young respondents face 
bigger uncertainty concerning their retirement plans, so that their answers are likely to 
undergo  bigger  changes  over  time  and  to  be  less  representative  of  the  actual 
behaviour.  However,  in  this  work  we  are  not  interested  in  the  match  between 
expectations and outcomes, but rather in the expectations themselves, as we believe 
they are the driving force of today's behaviours (such as saving decisions). Therefore, 
as  long  as  reported  ERAs  are  not  random  numbers  but  a  real  expression  of 
individuals'  expectations,  it  does  not  matter  if  they  do  not  exactly  match  future outcomes. 
Second, the distribution of the main characteristics does not reveal a specific bias 
toward  specific  subgroups.  On  the  contrary,  the  sample  seems  to  offer  a  good 
variation allowing for an accurate description of the distribution and the determinants 
of subjective retirement expectations. 
Finally, the structure of the sample is pretty stable over time. In other words, the 
sample does not seem to suffer from a selective drop-out: we can therefore rule out 
that the observed trends are simply due to a change over time in the composition of 
the data. However, as selective attrition could seriously bias the results, we will have 
a closer look at this topic.  
Table 3 offers an overview of how respondents of the 2005 sample are distributed by 
the number of waves they participated in the panel. Of all the individuals observed in 
2005, more than 60% remained in the sample for at least 3 waves. About a quarter, 
however, dropped out after only one wave.
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Total 841 100% 
A common way for detecting attrition bias in the characteristics of the sample is to 
use t-tests to compare those who responded to all waves with those with a lower 
survival in the panel (see for example Miller and Wright, 1995). 
For the households in the sample 2005, we have compared the means of selected 
variables among the various subgroups (survival in the panel for 5 waves vs. survival 
in the panel for only i waves, i= 1 to 4) to see if the differences are statistically 
significant. 
We  find  little  evidence  of  selective  attrition  for  the  education  variables.  The 
percentage  of  respondents  with  the  lowest  secondary  degree  (Hauptschule)  e.g.  is 
significantly higher among those who dropped out of the panel after one wave than 
among  those  who  remained  until  2009  (Diff.  =  8.1  percentage  points,  p-value  = 
0.052). The same applies for individuals without post-secondary qualifications: their 
                                                 
15  A drop-out can happen either because the respondent refused to participate in further waves of the 
survey, or because he/she changed status so that have been discarded from our sample (for example 
she/he retired, or she/he turned into self-employment). percentage is significantly higher among those who dropped out after one wave in 
comparison  with  those  who  are  observed  for  all  5  waves  (Diff.  =  6.6  percentage 
points, p-value = 0.023). There are no further significant differences looking at other 
characteristics such as age, marital status or wealth.
16  
While attrition based on observable characteristics is harmless when performing a 
multivariate analysis, attrition based on unobservable attributes may severely bias the 
results: if, for example, individuals with higher labour attachment are more likely to 
stay longer in the panel and at the same time more likely to report higher ERAs, the 
regression results would overestimate the upward adjustment in the ERAs over time.   
Indeed, looking at the reported ERAs in 2005, we find a slightly significant difference 
of  about  half  a  year  between  respondents  who  dropped  out  after  one  wave  and 
individuals who are observed for all the 5 waves, although no significant differences 
are found among respondents with other different panel survival (Table 4). 
Table 4: ERA by number of waves in the panel. Sample 2005. 
ERA by panel survival  Difference  p-value  Number of 
waves in 
the panel  waves = i  waves = 5     
i  = 1  63.43  63.93  -0.50  0.079 
i  = 2  63.91  63.93  -0.02  0.960 
i  = 3  63.32  63.93  -0.61  0.119 
i  = 4  63.65  63.93  -0.28  0.510 
   
In order to control for possible selection bias due to attrition, we follow the approach 
suggested in Verbeek and Nijman (1992) and include various selectivity dummies in 
our regressions.  
4.2 Descriptive analysis: how reliable are retirement expectations data? 
Figure 1 plots the distribution of ERA answers for men and women separately. The 
distribution of the expected ages of retirement is dominated for both men and women 
by spikes at specific ages such as 60, 65, 67 and, to a lesser extent, 63 and 70. 
                                                 
16  We compared: age, marital status, education, unemployment status, past spells in unemployment 
and stock of financial assets. Results available upon request. For a general overview of attrition 
rates in the SAVE survey see Börsch-Supan et al., 2008.  
Figure 1: Distribution of the Expected Retirement Age by gender 
 
These spikes (or focal points – FPs thereafter) are related to institutional aspects of 
the  German  pension  system:  60  years,  for  example,  represents  the  age  at  which, 
before  the  1992  reform,  men  were  first  allowed  to  claim  disability  benefits  and 
women were allowed to enter early retirement.  
The dominance of the distribution by spikes at “institutional” ages might suggest that 
little  relevant  information  is  provided  by  these  responses.  Indeed,  looking  at  the 
SAVE respondents who, over the whole period 2001 – 2009, entered into retirement, 
we can see that the actual retirement ages are distributed much more continuously 
(see Figure 2). 
This phenomenon is actually common also to other studies  who elicit expectations as 
point estimates (for the US see Bernheim, 1989; for the UK see Disney and Tanner, 
1999; for Italy, see Mastrogiacomo, 2004; for Australia, see Cobb-Clark and Stillman, 
2009). In fact, given that individuals have to report a single summary statistics of their 
underlying distribution of possible retirement ages, the distribution of the reported 
expectations  is  by  construction  more  heavily  concentrated  than  the  distribution  of 
actual retirement ages, even if the two distributions were the same. To avoid such a 
problem,  other  surveys  (such  as  the  U.S.  Health  and  retirement  survey)  ask 
individuals to indicate the chances of various future events, such as retiring at 62 or 
65, on a scale of 1 to 10.  
Figure 2 Distribution of the Actual Retirement Ages by gender 
Source: SAVE-Data 2001 – 2009; employees only; men = 141 obs.; women=183 obs.  
 
Nonetheless, we can argue that the answers are still informative about individuals' 
expectations. First, not-sophisticated individuals might have a specific retirement age 
in mind rather than a distribution of probabilities, and it could be difficult for them to 
translate such specific ages into probabilities. Second, reported retirement ages vary 
with individual characteristics in a reasonable manner: several studies find out that 
observable characteristics, known to affect actual retirement decisions, co-vary with 
retirement  expectations  in  a  similar  way.  In  a  panel  setting  they  also  find  that  in 
proximity of retirement the reported expectations of are strong predictors of the actual 
age of retirement also after including a large number of observable characteristics.
17 
A further piece of evidence in favour of the informativeness of the answers especially 
in  relation  with  the  effect  of  a  change  in  the  SRA  can  be  found  looking  at  the 
evolution of the FPs over time for different cohorts.  Table 5 shows the percentage of 
respondents reporting specific FPs by gender and reform affectedness. Columns 4 and 
8 report the percentage of respondents that report a specific ERA in each year as well 
as  in  the  whole  sample,  while  columns  1  –  3  and  5  –  7  report  the  percentages 
according to the individuals’ SRA as after the reform 2007.
 18 First of all we can note 
                                                 
17   Disney and Tanner, 1999, Dwyer and Benítez-Silva, 2002, Loughran et al., 2001, Haider and 
Stephens, 2007 
18   As for many cohorts the SRA is not an integer (cohorts born between 1947 and 1957 have to retire 
with 65 years and x months; the cohorts 1959 – 1963 have to retire with 66 and x months) while the that the percentage of people reporting an ERA of 66 years increases from less than 
1% in 2005 to about 4% for both men and women (columns 4 and 8). The increase is 
however much more pronounced among the cohorts with a SRA after the reform of 
66 years (columns 2 and 6), while it is almost not existent among the cohorts with a 
new SRA of 67 (columns 3 and 7). Similarly, we can observe a general decline over 
time in the percentage of individuals with an ERA of 65 years (from almost 50% in 
2005  to  little  more  than  30%  in  2009  for  both  men  and  women).  The  decline  is 
however much more pronounced among the cohorts whose new SRA is 66 or 67, 
while the percentage of respondents reporting an ERA of 65  years remain almost 
constant among those, whose new SRA is still around age 65. The respondents appear 
therefore to adjust meaningfully their answers.  
Table 5: Percentage of respondents reporting specific ERAs 
SRA = 65 SRA = 66 SRA = 67 Total SRA = 65 SRA = 66 SRA = 67 Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ERA 60 16.2% 22.2% 12.4% 15.6% ERA 60 29.8% 26.1% 24.5% 26.4%
ERA 65 50.3% 48.9% 45.4% 47.6% ERA 65 44.8% 50.6% 49.7% 48.5%
ERA 66 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 0.6% ERA 66 0.0% 0.0% 1.3% 0.6%
ERA 67 0.0% 5.3% 12.5% 7.2% ERA 67 1.5% 2.5% 3.2% 2.6%
Observations 115 75 175 365 Observations 138 122 216 476
ERA 60 14.2% 10.2% 11.2% 11.9% ERA 60 20.6% 23.2% 13.5% 17.7%
ERA 65 44.6% 33.1% 30.6% 35.0% ERA 65 41.3% 33.9% 32.8% 35.5%
ERA 66 1.2% 7.7% 2.9% 3.4% ERA 66 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4%
ERA 67 4.2% 18.2% 28.6% 19.6% ERA 67 4.1% 19.1% 28.2% 19.3%
Observations 82 54 136 272 Observations 110 81 171 362
ERA 60 6.5% 6.9% 8.4% 7.7% ERA 60 17.3% 15.5% 9.2% 12.5%
ERA 65 48.5% 25.1% 20.0% 27.5% ERA 65 43.9% 44.9% 22.3% 32.4%
ERA 66 4.3% 15.1% 0.7% 4.5% ERA 66 6.4% 1.6% 0.0% 1.9%
ERA 67 5.6% 30.0% 37.0% 28.5% ERA 67 5.6% 18.4% 39.1% 26.5%
Observations 70 53 130 253 Observations 93 73 161 327
ERA 60 8.7% 9.1% 10.0% 9.5% ERA 60 19.3% 13.1% 11.4% 13.7%
ERA 65 48.9% 32.0% 24.2% 30.9% ERA 65 35.2% 51.2% 28.3% 35.1%
ERA 66 5.1% 13.7% 1.6% 4.7% ERA 66 8.6% 1.4% 1.4% 3.2%
ERA 67 5.0% 12.2% 28.8% 20.5% ERA 67 3.4% 13.2% 34.8% 22.2%
Observations 59 47 124 230 Observations 88 69 146 303
ERA 60 8.1% 6.7% 5.2% 6.1% ERA 60 14.8% 11.2% 8.9% 10.7%
ERA 65 51.0% 27.7% 26.6% 32.0% ERA 65 41.8% 34.4% 23.8% 30.3%
ERA 66 3.8% 16.8% 0.0% 4.2% ERA 66 3.4% 11.2% 0.0% 3.5%
ERA 67 7.0% 13.3% 39.2% 27.1% ERA 67 2.6% 24.3% 41.2% 28.8%
Observations 55 44 107 206 Observations 64 66 127 257
ERA 60 11.8% 11.9% 9.6% 10.7% ERA 60 21.6% 18.9% 14.0% 17.1%
ERA 65 48.6% 34.6% 30.0% 35.6% ERA 65 41.8% 43.7% 32.3% 37.4%
ERA 66 2.3% 9.7% 1.3% 3.3% ERA 66 3.4% 2.4% 0.6% 1.7%
ERA 67 3.6% 15.4% 28.4% 19.5% ERA 67 3.3% 14.1% 28.0% 18.4%
Observations 381 273 672 1326 Observations 493 411 821 1725







                                                                                                                                            
ERAs can be reported only as an integer, we have to make some assumptions on the way the 
respondents round their answers. Table 3 is based on the assumption that individuals round their 
SRAs to the lowest integer. Individuals whose SRA is 65+x months, therefore, are classified as 
“Retire at 65”, while those whose SRA is 66+x months are classified as “Retire at 66”. The results 
are robust to different classification schemes.  
The reported ERAs change over time. Table 6 shows how employees modify their 
answers  across  adjacent  waves.  Most  of  the  respondents  (about  90%)  answer  the 
question in both wave t-1 and t. Only a small fraction of respondents has a missing in 
two consecutive waves, although this percentage shows an increasing trend over time, 
particularly  after  2007.  The  percentage  of  those  who  stop  reporting  their  ERA  is 
generally compensated by those who start doing so, with the only exception of 2007, 
where  the  respondents  stopping  reporting  their  ERAs  outnumbered  the  others  by 
almost 2 to 1.  
Table 6: Expected Retirement Ages across adjacent waves: patterns of answers, 
employees only. 
   Year    
   2006  2007  2008  2009  Total 
reports a value in t-1, missing value in t    
Frequency  23  39  22  25  109 
Percentage  3.99  7.49  4.43  5.76  5.37 
ERA in t-1 > ERA in t    
Frequency  93  96  132  63  384 
Percentage  16.15  18.43  26.56  14.52  18.93 
ERA in t-1 = ERA in t    
Frequency  234  188  216  214  852 
Percentage  40.63  36.08  43.46  49.31  42.01 
ERA in t-1 < ERA in t    
Frequency  203  171  88  104  566 
Percentage  35.24  32.82  17.71  23.96  27.91 
missing value in t-1, reports a value in t    
Frequency  21  20  25  19  85 
Percentage  3.65  3.84  5.03  4.38  4.19 
missing values in both t-1 and t    
Frequency  2  7  14  9  32 
Percentage  0.35  1.34  2.82  2.07  1.58 
Total    
   576  521  497  434  2,028 
 
While about 40% of the respondents report the same ERA in two consecutive waves, 
almost  50%  revise  their  plans.  Among  those  reporting  a  different  ERA  in  a 
subsequent wave, more than 50% moved to values in a range of 2 years above or 
below their initial choice and only about 10% revised their expectations by more than 
6 years. Interestingly, while the fraction of those increasing their ERA is higher than 
that of respondents who revise their ERAs downward, it shows a declining trend over 
time. It seems that a lot of upward revision took place before 2007. In 2008, after the 
bill  of  reform  was  passed,  many  more  respondents  revised  their  expectations 
downward. This pattern suggests that i) individuals anticipated the reform and that ii) 
they probably expected a much higher increase in the legal retirement age than it was actually  implemented.  All  in  all,  these  patterns  do  not  suggest  random  or  erratic 
survey responses and increase our confidence in the data at hand.  
A  further  issue  that  has  attracted  considerable  attention  in  previous  analyses  of 
subjective  retirement  expectations  is  how  to  interpret  don’t  know  answers.  While 
pioneer studies such as Bernheim (1989) simply dismiss those giving a don’t know 
answer  from  the  sample,  subsequent  studies  found  that  these  answers  are  still 
informative,  representing  rational  responses  by  those  who  face  greater  uncertainty 
over  their  future  behaviour  (Disney  and  Tanner,  1999;  Mastrogiacomo,  2004). 
Furthermore,  when  analysing  the  determinant  of  retirement  expectations,  Benítez-
Silva and Dwyer (2002) find that those not reporting an ERA are structurally different 
from the other respondents and that the induced selection bias is significant.  
In the SAVE survey, non-response rates to the question on expected retirement are 
quite low: on average, only 6% of the respondents do not answer the question. This 
rate is much lower than in the UK Retirement Survey or in the Australian HILDA (in 
both surveys about 30% of women and 20% of men report a don’t know; Disney and 
Tanner, 1999; Cobb-Clark and Stillman, 2009) and more in line with missing rates in 
the  Italian  SHIW  (where  they  are  for  both  men  and  women  around  5%  - 
Mastrogiacomo, 2004).
19 Reassuringly only less than 2% of the respondents do not 
answer the question over two adjacent waves (table 6).  
Rather than being constant over time, however, missing rates almost double in 2007 
and despite a little decline, they remain at similarly higher level in the following years 
(Figure  3).  This  pattern  could  be  interpreted  as  a  sign  of  increased  uncertainty, 
probably generated by the reform of the statutory retirement age in 2007 and by the 
economic crisis in the years 2008 and 2009.  
 
                                                 
19 It should be reminded, however, that while in the UK and in the Australian survey „don’t know“ is 
an explicit response option, in SAVE and in the SHIW the respondents can either report a value or 
skip the question. The different framing might therefore explain the different answering behaviour.   
Figure 2: Non-response rates to the question on Expected Retirement Age 
  
This increase of the missing rates might represent a source of bias if individuals who 
keep on reporting their ERAs are systematically different from those not reporting. 
We will test that later using an Heckman selection model.  
 
4. The increase of the ERA 
Scope of this section is to measure explicitly the effect of the reform on the ERA: did 
the reform 2007 induce any update of the ERA? If yes, by how many years did the 
ERA increase as an effect of the reform?  
Figure 3 shows that on average the ERA increased over time for both genders; for 
women, however, the increase is even more pronounced so that over time the gap in 
the retirement expectations between men and women is almost closed by 2009. 
Figure 3: ERA by gender and year 
  
Moreover, we observe that younger cohorts (born 1964 or later) expect to retire on 
average significantly later than middle-aged (born between 1958 and 1963) or older 
cohorts and over time the increase in their ERAs is stronger. However, expectations 
so far have not been adjusted to the full extent, but remain at best roughly one year 
below the statutory retirement age. The upward trend is furthermore more accentuated 
for younger cohorts than for older cohorts (Figure 4).  
This evidence, however, cannot be causally interpreted, as the trend might be driven 
by other factors, not related with the reform 2007. For example, individuals may be 
simply revising their expectations upward because they get older: Benítez-Silva and 
Dwyer, 2002 for example find that individuals tend to postpone their ERA as they get 
closer to their retirement age. So, the fact that the individuals in our sample simply get 
older  over  time  (we  have  indeed  a  panel),  may  drive  the  upward  trend.  More 
generally, it could be that an upward trend in the ERA was already in place (maybe as 
an effect of previous reform of the pension system, which -as sketched in section 2, 
abolished some of the most frequently used possibilities to claim early retirement). 
To  single  out  the  effect  of  the  reform  on  expectations,  we  rely  therefore  on  a 
difference-in-differences  (DD)  approach.  In  the  following  we  focus  only  on  the 
younger cohorts (born 1064 and later) which are fully affected by the reform (that is, 
they  have  to  retire  at  67  years),  so  that  for  all  the  individuals  considered  in  the 
regressions the SRA shifted by the same amount of years. The basic idea of the DD 
Figure 4: ERAs over time by gender and birth cohort 
 estimator is to compare over time the outcomes of individuals who are affected by the 
reform  with  the  outcomes  of  individuals  who  are  not  affected:  the  change  in  the 
outcome of the untreated group should identify any temporal variation in the outcome 
that is not due to the policy. Therefore, once we control for all the possible observable 
characteristics  that  may  determine  a  difference  in  the  outcome,  any  remaining 
difference in the ERA between the two groups is due to the reform. In doing so, we 
are  assuming  that  any  unobservable  difference  between  treated  and  control  group 
remains constant over the period under analysis (time-invariance assumption). The 
critical assumption underlying this estimator is that the control group represents the 
“right”  counterfactual  for  the  treated,  that  is,  they  should  perfectly  mirror  the 
evolution in the ERAs of the “treated” in the case the reform had not taken place. It is 
therefore extremely important to choose the control group very carefully.  
The institutional aspects of the reform 2007 offer two possible control groups. As the 
reform affects only employees born after 1947, a first comparison group could be 
found in the cohorts of employees born before 1947. Two aspects, however, are cause 
of concern.  First, it could be that ERAs of older individuals, who are closer to their 
retirement, are more stable over time, while ERAs of younger individuals, with many 
years to go before retirement and who are facing a much higher degree of uncertainty, 
might  evolve  with  a  different  pace.  Second,  as  we  are  analysing  a  panel  dataset, 
selectivity  of  the  older  individuals  might  represent  a  problem.  Indeed,  we  might 
expect that the sample of older employees becomes from year to year biased toward 
individuals with a higher preference for working (and therefore with higher ERAs on 
average) as individuals with a lower taste for working will choose to retire, dropping 
out  of  the  sample.  These  two  factors  question  the  validity  of  the  time-invariance 
assumption and therefore the validity of our identification strategy. 
Our analysis, therefore, uses a different control group, namely the self-employed. The 
idea here is to compare the outcomes of employees fully affected by the reform (born 
after  1964)  with  those  of  self-employed  belonging  to  the  same  cohorts.  As  the 
individuals in both groups belong to the same cohorts and are therefore at the same 
stage of their life-cycle, we get rid of the first problem (i.e. the different time horizon 
that  younger  and older  cohorts have when reporting their ERA). Furthermore, we 
have no reason to assume that in one group the panel selectivity should be different as 
in the other.  The two groups have of course different underlying preferences for 
leisure, but the difference should stay constant over time and any observed difference 
in the evolution of their ERAs over time should be due to the fact that employees are 
affected by the reform and self-employed not.  
Another choice that has to be made concerns the cut-off point, that is the years that 
correspond to the „before“ and „after“ period. Here we also made 2 different choices:  we consider first the period 2005-2006 as „before“ and the years 2007-2009 as „after“ 
(Table 6, Model 1). Then we run the same regressions using 2005 as „before“ and 
2007-2009 as „after“ (Table 6, Model 2 and 3). The second specification is more 
appropriate if the discussion of the reform before the bill was approved prompted 
individuals to react in anticipation. Indeed, as the analysis in section 4 and Figure 3 
and 4 highlight, individuals revised their ERAs a lot already in 2006. 
To check for possible biases in the estimates due to panel attrition we include in the 
regressions selectivity dummies. They take value 1 if the respondent participates in 
year t and at least once more after year t (t= 2005, …, 2008), otherwise the dummy is 
equal to zero.
20 If the selectivity dummies are jointly significant, there is an attrition 
bias problem. It is worth to stress here that the inclusion of the dummies does not 
explicitly correct for the attrition bias.  
Finally, we take care of possible biases in the estimates induced by a non-random 
distribution of missing answers to the ERA question estimating a two-step Heckman 
selection model. To do so we need an exclusion restriction, that is we need one or 
more variables affecting the probability of not answering the question on the ERA 
without directly affecting the reported ERA. In the analysis we use several indicators 
taking value 1 if the respondent did not answer the following questions: expectations 
concerning  respondent’s  income,  health  and  life  expectancy;  probability  of  an 
increase  in  own  income;  probability  to  be  unemployed  in  the  next  12  months; 
ownership of assets for the old-age. The idea behind the choice of these variables is 
that individuals who are not able to formulate expectations in these areas are facing 
higher uncertainty and are therefore more likely to be insecure also about their ERA. 
At the same time, there is no apparent reason to support the fact that not being able 
(or willing) to answer questions on expectations or asset ownership should affect the 
ERA if reported. 
The choice of the various explanatory variables is mainly driven by the consideration 
of the factors driving actual retirement behaviour as described in section 3. Besides 
controlling for the usual socio-demographic characteristics (gender, age, marital status 
and educational level)
21 we include also: household financial situation; employment 
status and employment history of the individual; self-assessment of current health 
status, expectations and satisfaction with the current job. 
Table 7 reports the results of the estimations. Reassuringly, the reported ERAs vary 
with  individual  covariates  in  a  reasonable  manner:  expectations  appear  to  be 
                                                 
20 In the following regressions, the reference group is therefore made up of all the individuals observed 
only in the survey 2005 (all the selectivity dummies equal to zero). 
21 In line with several studies focussed on Germany, we use two set of variables to measure educational 
achievements. The first includes variables measuring the highest secondary school leaving certificate; 
the second set includes variables measuring post-secondary and tertiary school achievements. influenced by the same factors affecting actual retirement behaviour (see section 3). 
So, for example, we find a positive effect of education on the expected retirement age: 
individuals with the German Abitur (the highest secondary school leaving certificate, 
earned after 13 years of schooling) expect on average to retire 8.5 months later than 
individuals with the lowest certificate (Hauptschulabschluss, earned after 8 years of 
schooling). Similarly, having a university degree shifts the ERA by almost one year. 
Individuals with past unemployment spells also expect to retire later: the longer are 
the spells, the later the ERA. This is a reasonable result: as the increase in the SRA 
practically  trims  future  pension  benefits,  individuals  with  a  less  continuous 
employment history have to work longer to compensate for the reduction in their 
future  pensions. This  result  speaks  therefore  in  favour  of  the  effectiveness  of  the 
reform in changing individual expectations. The ownership of real estates or of assets 
which are specific for the old-age (such as occupational pension plans or private old-
age  provisions)  seems  to  have  a  negative  effect  on  ERA,  although  none  of  the 
coefficient  is  significant  at  conventional  levels.  Similarly,  individuals  living  in 
households with a higher net monthly income appear to have lower ERAs. Finally, we 
find that women expect to retire earlier than men, the difference being almost one 
year. The fact that relatively young women are still planning to enter retirement earlier 
than  men  might  be  cause  of  concern.  Women  tend  to  have  less  continuous 
employment histories and are more often employed only part-time, so that they tend 
to accrue lower pension benefits. Furthermore, as women have on average a higher 
life expectancy, an early entry into retirement means that, unless they provide more 
privately for their old-age, they will have to live for longer time on a meagre pension. 
The coefficient of interest is that on the interaction term between the dummy for the 
period “after” the reform and the dummy identifying the treatment group.  
The regression confirms the fact that much of the adjustment in the ERAs happened 
already in 2006: indeed, when we use 2007 (Model 1) as cut-off point to define our 
before/after time span, we find no significant difference between the treatment and 
control groups in the period after the reform. On the contrary, when 2006 is selected 
as threshold, the interaction term becomes significant.  
We find that, on average, individuals belonging to the cohorts that are fully affected 
by the reform increased their ERAs over time more than individuals in the control 
group. In the period after the reform the average increase in the ERAs of employees 
born after 1964 over that of self-employed belonging to the same birth cohorts, the 
average increase is about 1 year and almost 9 months. The null hypothesis that the 
coefficient on the interaction terms is equal to 2 (that is, the number of years by which 
the expectations of the individuals fully affected by the reform should be increased if 
these individuals fully incorporated the new SRA in their expectations) cannot be rejected by a Wald test.  
The  selectivity  indicators  are  jointly  significant  (c
2=  21.63;  p-value=  0.0002). 
However,  as  we  do  not  have  year  dummies  in  the  model  but  only  a  before/after 
indicator, the selectivity dummies might be capturing some time trends. Indeed, if we 
add the time dummies (Model 3) the selectivity indicators are not significant anymore 
(c
2= 7.18; p-value= 0.1266). At least among the youngest respondent, attrition does 
not seem to be a major problem. 
There is mild evidence of selectivity due to missing answer to the ERA question: the 
null  hypothesis  that  no  correlation  exists  between  the  selection  equation  and  the 
equation of interest can be rejected at 10% confidence level. The predictions indicate 
that missing answers are associated with individuals with lower ERAs. In fact, while a 
simple OLS model (Table7, Model 4) predicts an ERA of 63.2 year for the reference 
group, the predictions of the Heckman model return an average ERA of 62.5 years 
(Table 7. Model 2). Also the estimated effect of the reform is smaller once we correct 
for selectivity, although the magnitude of the reduction is quite small. 
Table 7:  Determinants of the ERAs, with and without correction for sample selection 
   Heckman  OLS 
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
   Cut-off = 2007  Cut-off = 2006  Cut-off = 2006  Cut-off = 2006 
            
age  -0.042**  -0.043**  -0.043**  -0.039* 
Post Reform  0.754  0.536  0.533  0.465 
Employee  -0.410  -1.417  -1.417  -1.483 
Employee*Post 
Reform  0.513  1.741**  1.739**  1.771** 
Female  -0.844**  -0.874**  -0.884**  -0.927** 
partner  -0.364  -0.426  -0.445  -0.435 
Female*partner  0.361  0.392  0.414  0.441 
East Germany  -0.375  -0.361  -0.348  -0.370 
Mittlere Reife  0.511*  0.546*  0.548*  0.498 
(Fach-)Abitur  0.777**  0.716*  0.706*  0.651 
Vocational training  0.777**  0.779**  0.776**  0.711** 
University degree  0.954**  0.963**  0.973**  0.943** 
Currently 
unemployed  0.328  0.371  0.390  0.338 
Past unemployment       
(< 6 months)  0.666***  0.637**  0.628**  0.607** 
Past unemployment       
( 6 months to 2 years)  0.719**  0.667**  0.654**  0.684** 
Past unemployment       
(more than 2 years)  0.757**  0.671**  0.649**  0.649** 
Financial wealth 
(/1000)  0.003  0.004  0.004  0.003 
Financial wealth 
squared  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Occupational 
pension? J/N  0.050  0.023  0.019  0.025 Private old-age 
provision? Y/N  0.000  -0.060  -0.054  -0.063 
Real Estates? Y/N  -0.167  -0.105  -0.103  -0.142 
Household net 
monthly income 
(/100)  -0.026  -0.024  -0.023  -0.032 
Household income 
squared  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Self-rated health:          
fair to bad  -0.105  -0.161  -0.171  -0.104 
Inheritance 
expected  -0.062  -0.066  -0.064  -0.086 
Worsening of health 
condition expected  -0.122  -0.093  -0.082  0.015 
Improving income 
expected  -0.037  -0.047  -0.042  -0.078 
Unemployment 
expected  -0.015  0.009  0.005  0.057 
Subjective life 
expectancy (years)  0.056***  0.055***  0.055***  0.050*** 
Expected 
replacement rate 
state pension  -0.015*  -0.014*  -0.014*  -0.014* 
Expected 
replacement rate: 
dont'know  -0.760  -0.690  -0.686  -0.702 
Unsatisfied with 
current job  -0.251  -0.220  -0.225  -0.158 
s05  -0.363  0.444  0.445  0.408 
s06  0.575**  -0.694***  -0.987**  -0.777*** 
s07  0.284  0.231  0.853  0.256 
s08  -0.415**  -0.473***  -0.624  -0.466*** 
Year 2006       0.298   
Year 2007       -0.619   
Year 2008       0.156   
Year 2009        (omitted)    
Constant  62.324***  62.494***  62.462***  63.201*** 
Joint significance selectivity indicators 
Chi-2  18.26  21.63  7.18  5.81 
p-value  0.0011  0.0002  0.1266  0.0001 
Test of independent equations (rho = 0) 
p-value  0.1191  0.0623  0.0591  - 
Legend: * p<.15; ** p<.1; *** p<.05 
Note: Reference group: Self-Employed, Male, West Germany, Hauptschule, No vocational training, 
employed, no past unemployment spells, good to very good self-rated health.  
 
It  has  to  be  noted  that  the  average  ERA  is  still  well  below  the  SRA.  Using  the 
coefficient of Model 2, the average ERA after the reform is 62.8 years for employees 
with the lowest secondary school degree and no further qualification. Even for the 
better educated (those with an Abitur and a university degree) the average ERA after 
the reform is 64.5 years, about 2,5 years less than the SRA. However, the results of 
our estimates show that the ERAs of those individuals are about 2 years higher than it 
would have been under the old institutional settings. 5. The role of information 
Here we want to look if individuals who are better informed about the pension system 
(how does it work and how much does it cost) have also different ERAs or a different 
adjustment pattern. 
We use two special questions asked in the questionnaire 2009. We cannot capture any 
causality between information about the pension system and adjustment in the ERA, 
as we do not know which was the level of knowledge before the reform 2007 and it 
could be the case that individuals’ knowledge about the pension system improved as 
an effect of the reform, if for example due to the great debate in the media about the 
increase in the SRA individuals became more interested or mindful about the public 
pension system. However we can observe if there is a correlation between information 
and retirement plans.  
The questions used in SAVE 2009 have been already asked in another survey (see 
Boeri et al., 2001 for further details) carried out in spring 2000 in Germany and in 
other three European countries. A that time in Germany 21% of the employees did not 
answer  the  question  on  the  contribution  rate,  while  of  those  who  answered,  45% 
reported a too low contribution rate (between 0 and 16% of gross income), 42% gave 
a  correct  answer  (the  true  contribution  rate  at  that  time  was  19.3%;  the  authors 
considered correct all the answers in a range between 16% and 25%) and 13% expect 
the rate to be too high (more than 25%) (see Boeri et al., 2001, Table 5). In the same 
survey it turns out that only 40.5% of the respondents know how the PAYG system 
work, while the remaining 59.5% thinks that at least a part of their contributions goes 
into a fund to pay their own future pensions (see Boeri et al. 2002, Table 2).  
In our sample we have that almost 6% of the employees did not answer the question 
about the functioning of the PAYG system. Of those who answer, 47% got it right: it 
astonishes that after so many reforms of the pension system, and so many public 
discussions, still the majority of the employees does not know how the system works. 
Concerning the question about the costs of the pension system, 57% of the employees 
reported a number; 31.5% chose the option “don’t know” while 11.5% completely 
skipped the question. Of those employees who answered, 47% got it correct (the true 
contribution rate at that time was 19.9%; we considered correct all the answers in a 
range between 18% and 22%) and 14% underestimated it but only a little bit (range 
between 15% and 18%). Still 30% of the respondents gave an answer between 0 and 
15%  (Table  8).  The  average  estimated  contribution  is  17.8%,  2  percentage  point 
below the true contribution rate, but still more than 1 percentage point above the 
estimate obtained in 2000, when the respondents underestimated the true contribution 
rate by 3 percentage points (Boeri et al. 2001). Table 8:  Cost of the pension system: distribution of the answer on the contribution 
rate 
Contribution rate Percentage of answers
[0 - 15%) 30.04%
[15% - 18%) 14.41%
[18% - 22%] 46.59%
(22% - ¥ 8.96%
 
 
Older  individuals  are  better  informed  about  the  pension  system  than  younger 
individuals: the percentage of correct answers to both questions increases with age as 
well  as  with  educational  attainments  (especially  post-secondary  and  tertiary 
education). 
Although a simple univariate analysis does not reveal a strong relation between the 
ERA and the degree of information about the pension system,
22 we still find evidence 
that a conspicuous lack of knowledge is correlated with lower reported retirement 
ages. When  looking  at  the  question  on  the  functioning  of  the  PAYG,  we  find  the 
lowest ERAs among those who did not answer the question and among those who got 
it completely wrong (thinking that the contributions are completely used to finance 
their own pensions). Similarly, respondents who think the contribution rate is between 
0 and 15% have also lower ERAs on average.
23 
Next we show the results of a multivariate analysis. We correct for selection due to 
missing answers to the ERA question using a two-step Heckman procedure as we did 
in the previous section. Here we include all the employees (not only those born after 
1964)  and  we  control  for  the  degree  of  affectedness  by  the  reform.  As  the  two 
knowledge questions have been asked only in 2009, we restrict our analysis only on 
those respondents who remained in the panel until 2009. To be parsimonious, rather 
than using different indicators for past unemployment spells of different length, we 
simply  use  a  dummy  variable  equal  to  1  if  the  respondent  has  no  unemployment 
spells. Model 1 in table 9 represents our baseline regression. In Model 2 we add a 
dummy equal to 1 if the respondent in 2009 gave the correct answer to the question 
on the functioning of the PAYG system and a dummy equal to 1 if the respondent did 
not  answer  the  question.  In  model  3  we  add  three  dummies  for  respondents  who 
answered  the  question  on  the  contribution  rate  within  different  ranges  and  an 
additional dummy for those who skipped the question. In model 4, finally, we put all 
                                                 
22 This lack of a strong relationship is probably due to the fact that several factors are mixed together 
and  cannot  be  disentangled  with  a  simple  bivariate  analysis:  so  for  example  we  have  that  older 
individuals knows better the pension system, but have also lower ERAs.  
23 Results available upon request the indicators together.
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Table 9: Effect of knowledge of the pension system on ERA 
              
Variable  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
              
          
Year 2006  0.8852***  0.7880***  0.7970***  0.7909*** 
Year 2007  1.3604***  1.3216***  1.3432***  1.3325*** 
Year 2008  1.1694***  0.9417***  0.9641***  0.9513*** 
Year 2009  1.3593***  1.2515***  1.2800***  1.2665*** 
New SRA:  65 + x   0.5408**  0.7493**  0.7072**  0.7511** 
New SRA:  66 + x  0.9941***  1.2686***  1.2790***  1.2861*** 
New SRA:  67  1.7088***  2.0576***  2.0487***  2.0818*** 
Female  -0.5773*  -0.5686  -0.6306  -0.545 
partner  0.2154  0.1072  0.098  0.0959 
Female*partner  -0.1509  -0.1016  -0.0094  -0.0984 
East Germany  -0.1787  -0.2728  -0.2089  -0.2231 
Mittlere Reife  0.0949  0.3286  0.3174  0.2974 
(Fach-)Abitur  0.3961  0.2943  0.272  0.2718 
Vocational training  0.3103  0.3638  0.3288  0.3466 
University degree  1.0202***  1.3903***  1.3329***  1.3470*** 
Currently unemployed  0.1179  0.2433  0.2234  0.2434 
No unemployment 
spells  -0.2978*  -0.3174  -0.2854  -0.2968 
Financial wealth 
(/1000)  -0.0037  -0.0042  -0.0048  -0.0048 
Financial wealth 
squared  0  0  0  0 
Occupational pension? 
J/N  -0.0813  -0.1508  -0.1557  -0.1752 
Private old-age 
provision? J/N  0.0048  -0.0563  -0.0691  -0.0576 
Real Estates? J/N  -0.104  -0.1911  -0.2118  -0.2096 
Household net monthly 
income (/100)  -0.0211***  -0.0197**  -0.0189*  -0.0203** 
Household income 
squared  0  0.0000*  0.0000*  0.0001* 
Self-rated health:          
fair to bad  -0.2910*  -0.1654  -0.1915  -0.1685 
Inheritance expected  -0.0286  0.1824  0.1291  0.1657 
Worsening of health 
condition expected  -0.2282  0.105  0.1425  0.1085 
Improving income 
expected  -0.0483  -0.0486  -0.0903  -0.0604 
Unemployment 
expected  -0.0123  0.1284  0.1245  0.1091 
Subjective life 
expectancy (years)  0.0596***  0.0568***  0.0549***  0.0566*** 
Expected replacement 
rate state pension  -0.0112*  -0.0076  -0.0084  -0.0081 
Expected replacement 
rate: dont'know  -0.4488  -0.0452  -0.0596  -0.0249 
                                                 
24 Even if the questions have been asked only in one year, we make use of all the waves available. The 
dummy has to be interpreted therefore as a control for individuals that in 2009 gave a certain 
answer. Unsatisfied with 
current job  -0.1734  -0.1417  -0.1326  -0.1419 
Functioning of PAYG: 
right    0.3114    0.2934 
Functioning of PAYG: 
missing    -1.0436**    -0.9640* 
contribution rate: 0 - 
15%      -0.4654*  -0.4484* 
contribution rate: 15 - 
18%      -0.1128  -0.0311 
contribution rate: > 
22%      -0.0005  -0.0137 
contribution rate: 
don’t know        -0.5380**  -0.4204 
Constant  59.0105***  58.4512***  59.0731***  58.7631*** 
 
We find that even after controlling for the educational attainments of the respondents 
a conspicuous degree of disinformation on the functioning and on the costs of the 
pension system is significantly related with a lower expected retirement age. More 
specifically, the ERA is about one year lower for respondents who do not answer the 
question on the functioning of the PAYG system. Reporting a very low contribution 
rate (in the range between 0 and 15%) reduces the ERA by another 5 months so that 
altogether those respondents who in 2009 do not know how the pension system works 
and who strongly underestimate the costs of the system plan to retire about 1,5 years 
earlier than better informed individuals.  
6. Summary and conclusions 
This paper contributes to the literature that examines individuals' retirement decisions 
and the effect that policy changes have on them. More specifically, we wanted to 
quantify  the  effect  of  an  increase  in  the  legal  retirement  on  individuals'  expected 
retirement age. We considered the legislative reform introduced in Germany in 2007, 
whose institutional settings offer a nice quasi-experimental context to properly single 
out the effect of the policy on expectations. Furthermore we take into account possible 
biases  induced  by  panel  attrition  and  non-response  to  the  question  on  expected 
retirement  age.  Finally  we  completed  the  analysis  by  examining  the  role  of 
information about the functioning of the pension system on the ERA. 
After providing extensive evidence that the answers given by the individuals convey 
useful  information,  we  find  that  the  reform  succeeded  in  shifting  the  retirement 
expectations of the younger cohorts. Using a difference-in-differences estimator, we 
find that on average the ERAs of individuals born after 1963 increased in the period 
after the implementation of the reform by about 2 years. Although the average ERA of 
those individuals is still below the SRA, the shift in the expectations means that these 
workers are going to enter retirement later than they would have done without the increase  in  the  SRA.  Beside  that,  we  find  that  less  educated  individuals  with  a 
relatively continuous employment history and living in wealthier households have on 
average  lower  ERAs.  This  result  can  be  positively  interpreted,  as  those  who  are 
planning an earlier retirement seem to have the financial means to afford it. 
It is widely discussed if an increase in the legal retirement age really represents a 
relief for the welfare state and which are its redistributional effects. As pointed out in 
Hanel (2010), if the postponement of the benefit claiming does not coincide with 
longer employment, and those who do not extend their employment have to rely on 
social transfers (like unemployment benefits), the gains for the welfare state may be 
quite  small,  while  the  income  situation  of  those  individuals  may  dangerously 
deteriorate. This paper cannot address this point directly. A future extension of our 
work will examine how a change in expectations affects actual households’ saving 
behaviour,  to  see  if  individuals  with  limited  employment  opportunities  but  longer 
expectations concerning benefit claiming are also saving more for their old-age.  
Finally, we find that the information of the pension system is a significant determinant 
of retirement expectations: not knowing how the PAYG system works, or how much 
does  it  costs  is  negatively  correlated  with  individuals’  ERA. Although  we  cannot 
capture any causal effect between the two variables, the fact that a correlation exists 
even  after individuals’ education is taken into account highlights the  relevance of 
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